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SUB-STATE CLIMATE PIONEERS: THE CASE OF SCOTLAND 
Nicola McEwen and Elizabeth Bomberg 
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ABSTRACT: 
Climate change poses a global challenge, but many of the most ambitious and innovative efforts to 
confront it have emerged from the sub-state level. While such action has received significant 
attention in North America, less attention has been paid to European sub-state nations and regions, 
even though several of these regions are at the forefront of policy efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions and promote renewable energy. This article begins to fill that knowledge gap. It 
explores the puzzle as to why, and how, given their more limited scope for policy action, some 
sub-state governments position themselves as ‘climate pioneers’. The article undertakes a heuristic 
case study of Scotland, which has developed a particularly ambitious climate change and 
renewable energy programme. Drawing on public policy literature, we use the case study to 
consider the extent to which such ambition is enabled by constitutional and fiscal capacity, 
facilitated by a cohesive policy network, and motivated by economic and political goals. While we 
find evidence of these enabling features in the Scottish case, we argue that understanding sub-state 
climate action also necessitates examining such action through the lens of territorial politics. 
Adopting a territorial perspective highlights the opportunities, constraints and motivations 
associated with the politics of territorial identity and multi-level government.  
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INTRODUCTION 
National governments have struggled to agree comprehensive and binding targets to tackle global 
climate change. UN climate summits have fallen well short of achieving the strong, integrated, 
international action most scientists argue is necessary to address the impacts of continued global 
climate change. Below the international and national level, however, climate action is vibrant. In 
particular, sub-state nations and regions have grown to be significant players in recent years, with 
many developing their own initiatives to combat climate change. Such efforts have received 
growing academic attention in the United States, where innovations among US states and cities are 
well-documented (Burke and Ferguson, 2010; Engel, 2009; Moser, 2007; Pitt, 2010; Rabe, 2008; 
2011). Far less attention has been paid to climate change policy among sub-state governments in 
Europe. Yet, these governments play a key role in facilitating (or hampering) the climate change 
mitigation targets set by decision-makers at a higher level, including European Union (EU) 
programmes and directives. Moreover, many sub-state governments in Europe have not confined 
themselves to the role of implementers of policy set by higher authorities; several of Europe’s 
leading legislative regions have assumed the role of what we call ‘climate pioneers’ – actors who 
develop initiatives that entail markedly more ambitious policy goals and further practical policy 
experimentation than usually found at the national or supranational level (Galarraga, et al. 2011; 
Hoffman, 2011).  
 
In this article, we seek to explore climate ambition at the sub-state level by undertaking a heuristic 
case study of Scotland, one of Europe’s leading sub-state nations at the forefront of policy 
initiatives designed to mitigate climate change and encourage a transition to a low carbon 
economy. We focus on two areas of policy output – emissions reduction and renewable energy – 
where the Scottish Government has been especially ambitious. Legislative devolution was 
introduced to Scotland in 1999, establishing a Scottish Parliament with legislative autonomy over 
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a wide range of domestic policies, including some policy fields linked to climate change. 
However, in Scotland, as elsewhere, climate change policy defies strict constitutional 
demarcations. Scottish policy is shaped – and often limited - by the resources, decisions and 
parameters set by national and supranational authorities. The level of activity of, and priority given 
by, the Scottish government in this sphere makes Scotland an interesting study in its own right. 
However, we also use our case study to explore the puzzle as to why, and how, given their more 
limited scope for policy action, some sub-state governments have positioned themselves at the 
forefront of pioneering policy initiatives intended to mitigate climate change. What resources do 
sub-state governments have at their disposal to facilitate policy innovation? Are the motivations 
behind their policy ambitions similar to those underpinning pioneering behavior among national 
level front-runners? Or are there particular territorial explanations as to why governments at the 
sub-state level become climate pioneers?  
 
To address these questions, we develop an analytical framework which identifies the general 
factors underpinning policy leadership in the climate arena. We draw broadly on public policy 
literature which presents competing explanations for policy development (see John 2012), but 
focus specifically on literature exploring pioneering behaviour in environmental policy among 
nation-states and in the EU. This literature points towards a broad range of constitutional, 
economic, social and political factors to explain why some countries are leaders and others lag 
behind in the environmental and climate policy arena (Héritier, 1996; Liefferink and Andersen, 
1998; Scruggs, 2003). We adapt these factors to the sub-state level, but suggest that these are 
likely to provide only a partial account of policy ambition. We anticipate that pioneering 
behaviour at the sub-state level also requires insights drawn from the literature on territorial 
politics to highlight the multi-level constraints shaping policy development, and the territorial 
ambitions and resources driving innovation. Our case study examines the explanatory potential of 
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each of the factors highlighted in the analytical framework. In so doing, we find that adapting 
existing explanations can go some way to explaining climate ambition in Scotland, but we also 
argue that pioneering behavior is also a useful means by which the Scottish government has 
asserted its territorial distinctiveness on the national and international stage, and used its natural 
resource capacities to assert and reinforce the demand for self-government. The article concludes 
by developing hypotheses that may be applied in other case and comparative studies of climate 
action among sub-state governments. 
 
UNDERSTANDING SUB-STATE PIONEERS  
Numerous studies have sought to explain why some nation-states emerge as pioneers - or  ‘pace-
setters’, ‘forerunners’ or ‘first movers’ - in environmental and climate policy (Börzel, 2002; 
Héritier, 1996; Jänicke, 2005; Lenschow, et al., 2005; Liefferink, et al., 2009; Liefferink and 
Andersen, 1998; Sbragia, 1996; Scruggs, 2003). These insights are useful and we incorporate them 
into our analytical framework. However, they adopt a narrow focus on the nation-state as the core 
locus of activity. For instance, Jänicke (2005: 132-3) suggests that nation-states are uniquely 
placed to lead in environmental policy because of their relatively high policy capacity with respect 
to financial resources, personnel, professional competence and coercive power. But assumptions 
that national governments, economies and societies are the pre-eminent unit of analysis arguably 
falls foul of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002) by taking the 
nation-state as the natural and most appropriate focus of research, and by ignoring the explicitly 
multi-level character of this policy field. Wimmer and Glick Schiller bemoaned the obsession of 
social scientists for describing and examining social and political processes within the ‘container’ 
of the nation-state, arguing that as a result they lost sight of the connections between these 
nationally-bounded territories (2002: 307). We might equally suggest that such methodological 
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nationalism loses sight of the variations within nation-states, which the rise of regional authority 
has rendered more visible (Hooghe, et al., 2010; Jeffery and Wincott, 2010).   
 
Studies of climate action among nation-states remain useful as a starting point to explain why any 
level of government would become a climate pioneer. To avoid the trap of methodological 
regionalism and giving undue paramountcy to region-specific features, we draw upon and adapt 
state-level explanations to the regional level in our framework set out below. Insight can also be 
gained from the rich pool of environmental federalism literature which has emerged to explain 
sub-federal climate action in Canada (Harrison 2007; Hoffman 2011; Selin and vanDeveer 2009) 
and especially in the United States, where the unwillingness of the Bush administration, and the 
inability of the Obama administration, to make significant headway on climate change mitigation 
has prompted pioneering activity among numerous states (Derthick 2010; Engel, 2009; Moser, 
2007; Posner, 2010; Rabe, 2011). We draw upon the explanations offered by both of these sets of 
literature to develop potential explanations for sub-state climate ambition in Europe. However, we 
supplement these explanations with particular insights drawn from the literature on territorial 
politics to help explain why some sub-state nations and regions may be particularly inclined to 
pursue ambitious climate policies and programmes. 
 
Capacity for Action 
One of the most important factors contributing to pioneering behavior is the ‘capacity for action’ 
(Jänicke, 2005; Liefferink et al., 2009). Capacity can be defined broadly to include (i) the 
constitutional authority to act in a given sphere and (ii) the fiscal autonomy to raise revenue and/or 
direct investment towards policy goals. Applied to the national level, capacity encompasses the 
legitimate political and jurisdictional authority, knowledge and resource base with which to make 
 6 
policy, the authority to raise revenue or design tax systems towards policy goals, and the ability – 
formal and informal - to engage and co-operate within international forums, including the EU.  
 
At the sub-state level, capacity above refers primarily to regional authority (Hooghe, et al., 2008) 
which can include both self-rule (regional constitutional competence, policy scope and revenue-
raising and spending autonomy) and ‘shared rule’, measured by the formal mechanisms for 
influencing policy, constitutional and fiscal decisions taken at higher levels.  Such capacity varies 
across states. Some sub-state governments, like the Canadian provinces, have jurisdiction over 
energy policy, and thus capacity to shape the energy market, while in other nation-states, like the 
UK, energy policy is mainly the preserve of the national government. In some multi-level states, 
the primary responsibility of the sub-state level is merely to implement decisions taken at higher 
levels, limiting the scope for sub-state innovation. By contrast, sub-state governments with high 
levels of ‘shared power’, as in Belgium and Germany, can shape, or obstruct, national decision 
making in a wide range of policy spheres, including those which shape a state’s response to 
climate change.  
 
Economic Motivation 
Cross-national comparisons of environmental leaders and laggards have identified strong links 
between economic development and pioneering behaviour. Indeed, for Börzel, the level of 
economic development was the key factor determining whether EU member states were at the 
forefront of environmental policy outputs, especially in the area of environmental regulation 
(Börzel, 2002; see also Jänicke, 2005). Literature on state pioneers suggests that environmental 
pioneers are often motivated by the economic gains that may accrue from being at the forefront of 
policy development, especially where this involves technological innovation and export 
opportunities. For example, Denmark and Germany, two of the most prominent environmental 
 7 
‘pioneers’ in Europe, were among the first to manufacture on-shore wind turbines. In the field of 
renewable energy, in particular, states with the greatest natural resource capacity may also be 
motivated to act as ‘renewables pioneers’ precisely because of the competitive advantage such 
investment could bring (Porter, 1990). These economic motivations are evident at the sub-state 
level too. Rabe (2011) suggests that US states demonstrating pioneering climate policies have 
been at least as motivated by the chance to exploit strategic economic advantage as by carbon 
reduction or broader environmental goals. A similar phenomenon can be observed among city 
climate champions, who see climate policies as an opportunity for enhancing ‘smart growth’, as 
well as potentially generating cost-savings (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Sippel and Jenssen, 2010). 
 
Policy Networks 
Climate and energy innovation is also heavily reliant on the willingness and support of networks 
of civil society actors, including industry, labour, experts and NGOs. Jänicke (2005) highlighted 
how expert advice from scientists, economists and engineers can guide governments seeking to set 
policy goals that are reliant on technological innovation. Scruggs’ (2003) suggested innovative or 
far-reaching environmental action is more likely in states marked by neo-corporatist bargaining 
between employers, labour unions, industry representatives, and government officials. Such 
bargaining helps create the consensus needed for environmental innovation and change (see also 
Liefferink, et al., 2009). Industry and scientific experts can more directly shape policy action 
through their participation in influential advisory boards (Liefferink and Anderson, 1998). More 
broadly, environmental activists, green parties and NGOs have been identified as important civil 
society actors expressing and encouraging strong public support for environmental innovation and 
policy learning (Scruggs, 2003; Lenschow, et al, 2005; Bomberg, 2009). Civil society’s role is 
often described as taking place within policy networks – collections of stakeholders featuring an 
informal exchange of information, access and resources (Marsh 1998; Peterson 2009). Such 
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informal exchange fosters shared knowledge, compromise and consensus among diverse actors 
within and beyond government to work collectively to address policy challenges. Most of the 
policy networks literature focuses on state-wide level activity, but these networks are found at sub-
state level too (Keating et al., 2009). Indeed, small highly solidaristic nations and regions with a 
strong shared sense of territorial distinctiveness may be better placed to support interest mediation, 
compromise and co-operation between key stakeholders by fostering mutual trust and common 
territorial goals (Rhodes, 1996: 169).  
 
Multi-level Dynamics    
Much of the literature examining pioneering behaviour among national governments in the EU 
recognizes the multi-level character of this policy arena. Many scholars portray such behaviour as 
a ‘two-level game’, aiming not just to spur innovation at home, but also to raise regulatory 
standards internationally (Börzel, 2002; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Sbragia, 1996). Policy 
pioneers seek ‘first mover advantage’ (Héritier, 1994), to ensure that standards adopted within 
supranational or international forums reflect their preferences and practices. In the European 
Union, in particular, ensuring a level playing field in ‘their’ area of innovation helps pioneers to 
avoid the costs of legal and institutional adjustments in the wake of EU regulation, while 
maximizing opportunities for those domestic industries marketing technologies suited to the new 
regulatory framework (Héritier, 1994: 151; see also Vogel 1995; Halpern, 2010).  
 
Member-state governments are clearly the key players in EU decision-making, but sub-state 
governments can also shape European policy-making, sometimes directly through regional offices 
in Brussels or the Committee of the Regions, but more often indirectly by shaping their member-
state government’s negotiating position (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Van den Brande, 2011). In climate policy, in particular, international coalitions of sub-state 
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governments have sought direct access to the European Commission through advocacy groups 
such as the Climate Group and the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable 
Development (nrg4sd), albeit thus far with limited results (Happaerts, et al., 2010). Nonetheless, 
sub-state pioneers clearly participate in a three-level game, seeking the same strategic advantages 
as other ‘first movers’ by maximising the domestic opportunities and minimizing implementation 
costs associated with both national and supranational regulation. Sub-state governments are bound 
by the international obligations undertaken by their national governments, and are often dependent 
upon the domestic policy decisions they make with respect to finance and investment in low 
carbon technologies, the design and regulation of the energy market, or the regulation of domestic 
energy consumption.  
 
Sub-state activities are not entirely determined by ‘higher level’ action: a striking feature of multi-
level systems is the extent to which action at one level of government can progress (indeed thrive) 
even if action at the other levels remains stymied. This has been a particular feature of sub-federal 
climate action in the United States. During the administration of George W Bush, the US federal 
government’s climate inaction created ‘an open intergovernmental field for state government 
engagement’ (Rabe, 2011; see also Derthick 2010), leading to extensive state-level innovation. 
This activity has included ambitious emissions reduction programmes among some states, 
collaborative cap-and-trade schemes and ‘renewable portfolio standards’ to facilitate and 
incentivize the transition away from fossil fuels (Burke and Ferguson 2010; Moser, 2007; Rabe, 
2008; 2011; Kretzschmar and Whitford, 2012). Such initiatives, notwithstanding their variable 
degree of success, can serve to jump-start policy action by higher levels of government (Posner, 
2010), or can act as a ‘floor’, or a ‘backstop when the federal government fails to regulate’ 
(Engels, 2009: 450).  
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The Politics of Territorial Identity 
Our final explanation of sub-state pioneering behaviour emerges not from national level studies, 
but from the literature on territorial politics. In sub-state nations and regions, debates over the 
direction of public policy are often shaped by the politics of territorial identity. Governments 
engaging in policy making within strong identity nations and regions often frame their goals and 
demands as an opportunity to maximize the region’s autonomy and its voice and status within the 
larger state and beyond. This dynamic is especially strong in those territories where demands for 
more self-government are high on the political agenda, or where strong sub-state nationalist parties 
ensure that the territorial cleavage remains at least as strong as more conventional ideological 
cleavages. By adopting the role of climate pioneer, a sub-state government can reinforce its 
territory’s distinctiveness, assert the political importance of the sub-state level, and use the 
economic opportunities offered by low carbon innovation and renewables as justification for the 
pursuit of greater political autonomy. In addition, sub-state governments engaging in international 
climate forums or networks often see these as opportunities to appear ‘state-like’, giving them a 
profile on the world stage as well as enhancing their status with a home audience (Happaerts, et 
al., 2010: 130; Lecours, 2002: 100-102). As such, these forums not only offer opportunities to 
engage in multilateral decision-making and networking, but can contribute to strengthening 
territorial identity and nation-building. Climate and energy policy may be especially open to 
territorial politics; political leaders can make emotive associations with ‘our’ land and seas that are 
being exploited and polluted, or ‘our’ natural resources which are being harnessed. Territorial 
identity is collectively constructed and reinforced within such political discourse, and is also an 
expression of how individuals define themselves and their relationships with others. A population 
with a strong and distinctive sense of shared identity can represent a less tangible but tremendous 
resource to a government, or a movement, seeking to mobilize support for an ambitious policy 
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agenda, because of the feelings of solidarity and mutual trust such identity can generate (Calhoun, 
1994; Guibernau, 1999; McEwen, 2005)  
 
Thus, existing literature points towards several factors that underpin pioneering behaviour in 
national climate policy, and we anticipate that these also motivate sub-state policy actors. 
Ambitious policy-making is easier to achieve with the constitutional and fiscal capacity to support 
innovation. Sub-state governments producing policy outputs focused on low carbon futures may, 
like their national counterparts, be motivated by material incentives to promote key industries and 
export potential. And their policy programmes may be shaped and facilitated by close 
collaboration with non-governmental actors within the broader policy network, as well as the 
political pressure from environmentalists. However, sub-state governments are almost always 
constitutionally weaker than states, with a more limited range of policy and fiscal capacities, 
usually weaker bureaucracies and information resource strengths, and an often greater 
susceptibility to economic and political pressures from national and international developments 
(Keating and McEwen, 2005: 414-5). They are compelled and constrained by a multi-level 
political and institutional environment, though they may have additional non-constitutional and 
non-material resources at their disposal to aid policy innovation, including the shared solidarity 
and territorial distinctiveness that comes from being a sub-state nation or region within a larger 
polity. The explanatory power of each of these factors will be assessed in relation to our Scottish 
case study, with a view to generating hypotheses that other scholars may wish to apply to broader 
comparative studies to explain why some sub-state nations and regions are climate pioneers while 
others may lag behind.   
 
METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION 
This article conducts a single case study of Scotland, a sub-state nation within the EU at the 
forefront of policy outputs directed towards climate change mitigation and renewable energy. Its 
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action is far from unique. The existing literature documenting sub-state climate ambition has 
emerged mostly from the United States, where states from California to Vermont have developed 
their own carbon reduction schemes, or joined forces to co-ordinate their efforts. The most notable 
of these is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, involving nine north-east and mid-Atlantic 
states in a mandatory cap, reduce and trade scheme to lower carbon emissions (see Greenwald 
2013; Kretzschmar and Whitford, 2012). Globally, sub-state nations and regions committed to 
climate change mitigation have come together in groups such as the Climate Group States and 
Regions Alliance and the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development 
(nrg4sd), both to share best practice and to lobby higher authorities for stronger action at the 
supranational and international levels (Happaerts, et al., 2010). Involvement in such networks may 
reflect their lack of ability to influence national policy, but it nonetheless permits an international 
presence and profile. Many of Europe’s leading regions are at the forefront of these organisations. 
For example, the post of Catalan Minister for Territory and Sustainability goes hand in hand with 
being nrg4sd’s co-chair for the North. Of the 23 full members of the Climate Group’s States and 
Regions Alliance, 13 are in the EU, including strong identity nations and regions such as 
Catalonia, the Basque country, Bavaria, Brittany, Wales, as well as Scotland, with the Basque 
country acting as co-chair (Climate Group, 2011). These regions are implementing a range of 
innovative policies placing them at the forefront of climate action. The Basque country, for 
instance, introduced the first climate legislation in Spain as part of their comprehensive sustainable 
development strategy (Gobierno Vasco, 2011). Similarly, both the Catalan and Bavarian 
governments have introduced a raft of policies designed to reduce energy demand and dependence 
on fossil fuels, or expand the use of renewables (Climate Group, 2012).  
 
Yet, we know very little about the motivations that underpin such action on the part of sub-state 
nations and regions. Why do they act, in spite of their limited constitutional competence and 
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capacity vis-à-vis national governments and the scale of the policy challenge? Why not cede the 
ground to national governments and supranational institutions? To help provide an explanation, 
we conduct a hypothesis-generating case study (Lijphart, 1971: 691), or what Eckstein referred to 
as a heuristic case study (1975: 104), of Scottish climate ambition in order to test some 
expectations and develop more robust hypotheses which can be utilized in comparative research. 
Comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but we consider in the conclusion how the 
hypotheses generated from the Scottish case may be applied in a comparative context.  
 
An examination of Scottish policy development since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament 
in 1999 illustrates why Scotland may be characterized as a pioneer in energy and climate change. 
Although their predecessors had shown signs of climate ambition1, pioneering behaviour has been 
most evident since 2007, following the election of the Scottish National Party (SNP) to 
government. The government’s bold policy goals have been most clearly manifest in targets and 
innovative schemes to reduce emissions reductions, and in particular increase the proportion of 
energy met from renewable sources.  
 
The Climate Change (Scotland) Act (2009), introduced by the SNP government and skillfully 
shepherded through parliament where it was passed unanimously, imposed a statutory obligation 
to ensure a reduction in all greenhouse gas emissions by 42 percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 
2050.2 The Scottish Act is broader in scope and ambition than either the preceding Scottish 
Executive programmes, or the UK Climate Change Act (2008), and includes a higher interim 
target than the latter. It has far-reaching implications: it regulates the activities of government, the 
private sector and individuals; covers a wide array of devolved policies, including forestry, land 
use, the promotion of energy efficiency, waste reduction and recycling, as well as provisions for 
adapting to climate change; and obliges the government to set annual targets subject to 
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parliamentary approval. The 2011 report, Low Carbon Scotland: Meeting the Emissions Reduction 
Targets 2010-2022 acknowledged the scale of the challenge: Scottish emissions have fallen by 
21.2 percent since 1990, but the additional 21 percent reduction will require new policies, not all 
of which fall within the constitutional competence of the Scottish government (Scottish 
Government, 2011a). Indeed, although the first annual target was missed in 20103 (due largely to 
an exceptionally cold winter), the the UK Committee on Climate Change confirmed the overall 
trend towards emissions reductions, praising in particular government initiatives to eliminate 
waste, reduce energy demand and tackle fuel poverty through investment in home insulation, and 
accelerate the use of renewable power and heat (Committee on Climate Change, 2013). 
Underlining Scotland’s pioneer role, the Committee’s chief executive noted ‘A UK commitment 
on a 2030 carbon intensity target to mirror the Scottish commitment would be very beneficial for 
the investment climate’ (quoted in Clark 2013).   
 
The exploitation of Scotland’s renewables potential is central to the Scottish government’s climate 
ambitions, (Scottish Government 2011c). Scotland already has a substantial hydro capacity, 
stemming from an ambitious Scottish Office-led programme in the 1940s which transformed 
hydro-electricity in Scotland from its pioneering roots to a major nationalised industry. This 
existing capacity, combined with Scotland’s evident potential to exploit the natural resource of 
onshore and offshore wind, has made it relatively easy for successive Scottish administrations to 
set targets for renewable electricity which exceed both UK and EU targets. The SNP government, 
in particular, has embraced the renewables agenda with increasing enthusiasm since its election in 
2007. In 2008, it set a target of generating 50 percent of Scottish demand for electricity from 
renewable sources by 2020. By 2011, the target was to source the equivalent of 100 percent of 
Scotland’s electricity consumption from renewable sources by 2020. These ambitious renewable 
electricity targets have increased the overall target for sourcing all energy requirements from 
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renewables from 20 percent to 30 percent by 2020, on a par with Denmark (30 percent) and 
Portugal (31 percent), but notably higher than most other EU member states, and higher than the 
overall UK target (set by the EU) of 15 percent of all energy from renewables by 2020 (Scottish 
Government, 2011b).4  
 
Significant progress has been made in recent years. Between 2003 and 2011, renewable capacity 
in Scotland increased by 187 percent, with generation from renewables increasing by 269 percent 
over the same period. With 40% of the UK’s renewable capacity and generation based in Scotland 
in 2011, including almost half the UK’s wind power output, Scotland leads the way in the UK in 
renewable energy deployment (UK CCC, 2013: 18). Meeting the 2020 targets will require 
significant new installed capacity. To this end, the Scottish Government has introduced a range of 
initiatives and investments, over and above those implemented by the UK government, to support 
innovation, technological development, micro- and community-scale generation, and improve 
infrastructure for offshore development, alongside a political and planning framework conducive 
to renewables.  In short, , in its emissions reduction and renewables ambitions the Scottish 
government has clearly sought to place Scotland at the forefront of low carbon innovation in 
Europe, making it an ideal case study to explore the motivations that underpin sub-state climate 
ambition.  
 
The case study relies upon two main methods of data collection. First, we draw upon a wide range 
of documentary sources, including official policy documents, position papers, roadmaps and 
government reports, parliamentary debates and political speeches. Second, we conducted 35 semi-
structured elite interviews with serving and retired government ministers, officials in the Scottish 
and UK governments and the European Commission, and representatives from the broader policy 
community, including the regulator, the business community, and a very active energy 
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charity/NGO sector. Interviews with officials were designed to enhance our knowledge of policy 
developments, to gain insight into the multi-level policy environment and intergovernmental 
negotiation, and to identify motivations underpinning policy goals. Interviews with policy actors 
from the broader policy community were intended to elicit the extent of engagement between 
these actors and the government, the degree of consensus underpinning policy outputs, and 
informed evaluation of the policies. Many of these were recorded,5 and the resulting material was 
carefully analysed to help identify the extent to which policy outputs were underpinned by the 
factors outlined in our analytical framework.  
 
EXPLAINING SCOTLAND AS CLIMATE PIONEER  
In this section, we seek to understand why, in spite of its position as one small sub-state entity 
facing a global policy challenge, devolved Scotland has positioned itself as a frontrunner in 
devising policy outputs to reduce carbon emissions and dependence on fossil fuels. We draw upon 
the framework set out above to assess the relative influence of constitutional and fiscal capacities, 
economic motivations, policy networks, multi-level government and the politics of territorial 
identity. 
 
Capacity for action 
Governments seeking to engage in policy innovation require the capacity to make and implement 
policy decisions. In sub-state nations like Scotland, this capacity implies having the constitutional 
competence to make policy and legislative decisions, as well as the fiscal capacity to aid policy 
development, delivery and investment. 
 
Under the terms of the devolution settlement, set out in the Scotland Act (1998), Scotland has full 
legislative and administrative competence in those areas that are not explicitly reserved to the 
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Westminster parliament and government. This division of constitutional powers gives the Scottish 
Parliament and, hence, the Scottish government significant control over a range of domestic 
powers which might be deployed to mitigate climate change. These include environment, 
transport, waste management, rural affairs, land use, housing, planning regulations and the 
promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Scottish autonomy is further enhanced by 
powers that have been ‘executively devolved’, which means the Scottish government has been 
given responsibility to make executive decisions on particular matters, but not the power to make 
new law. The most significant in this field are the powers conferred by the UK Electricity Act 
(1989), including the power to grant or withhold consent for the construction of overhead 
transmission lines and new electricity generation. The latter has been invoked by the SNP 
government in its pledge to prevent any new nuclear power stations being built on Scottish soil. 
The Scottish government also negotiated discretion to modify the Renewables Obligation, 
currently the principal mechanism for promoting industry investment in renewable energy 
throughout the UK.6  
 
There are, however, clear constitutional constraints, especially in relation to energy policy. The 
Scotland Act reserved to Westminster: control over the generation, distribution, transmission and 
supply of electricity; the ownership and exploitation of oil, gas and coal; and nuclear energy and 
nuclear installations. As a result, the Scottish government can do little to influence the system of 
transmission charging, which it has frequently argued inhibits renewable energy investment by 
imposing the highest grid connection charges on those generating energy in regions remote from 
highly populated urban centres. In addition, the sea bed up to 12 nautical miles from the shoreline 
– the location of potential sites for offshore wind, wave and tidal power – is controlled by the 
Crown Estate. This is a commercial organization which manages the property owned by ‘the 
Crown’ on behalf of the UK. The Scottish government is dependent upon the Crown Estate’s 
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willingness to lease sites for offshore generation, and has criticized its (and effectively the UK 
Treasury’s) capacity to claim tax and leasing revenues from offshore developments in Scottish 
seas.  
 
There are also clear fiscal constraints resulting from limited fiscal autonomy, inhibiting the 
Scottish government’s ability to invest in research and infrastructure to facilitate the transition to a 
low carbon economy, or use taxation to encourage investment or modify behavior through ‘green’ 
taxes. Tax revenue is collected centrally in the UK, and around 90 percent of the Scottish 
government’s budget comes in the form of a direct transfer – the Scottish block grant - from the 
UK Treasury (see Bell and Christie, 2007). The Scotland Act (2012), when fully implemented in 
2015, will strengthen revenue-raising and borrowing capacity, but the overall effect is likely to be 
moderate rather than dramatic. Thus, the Scottish government remains dependent on the UK 
government for financial resources, for example, to support carbon capture and storage. The UK 
government and the energy regulator also oversee those regulatory policies designed to boost 
private investment in renewable energy. 
 
These constraints have not prevented the Scottish government from pursuing an ambitious climate 
change and renewable energy programme, nor from promoting its ambitions nationally and 
internationally, but they have necessitated close collaboration and negotiation with UK authorities. 
Such collaboration is reported as cordial and positive (interviews with officials in Scottish 
government and DECC, 22-28 September 2011), but it remains informal; intergovernmental co-
ordination remains characterized by low levels of institutionalization (McEwen et al, 2012). In 
pursuing its broader agenda for constitutional change, aimed at enhancing Scottish self-
government, the SNP government has prioritized more powers over energy policy. For example, 
following its re-election in 2011, the SNP demanded (unsuccessfully thus far) that the powers of 
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the Crown Estate be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, to facilitate the promotion of offshore 
and onshore renewables and accrue directly the resulting revenues this would bring. One of the 
papers emerging from the SNP government’s National Conversation on Scotland’s constitutional 
future made the case for the transfer of energy powers (under enhanced devolution or Scottish 
independence) to ensure the development of a regulatory and policy framework more suited to 
Scottish priorities (Scottish government, 2009b), a call echoed by some other civil society groups 
who oppose independence (Reform Scotland, 2011). And notwithstanding its limited budget and 
fiscal capacity, the Scottish Government has prioritized spending on renewables, for example, 
through a £70 million National Renewables Infrastructure Plan, a £60 million capital budget to 
support renewable technology, a £35 million fund to support prototypes for next generation 
offshore wind turbines, and the flagship £10 million Saltire Prize, an international innovation prize 
to promote the deployment of marine renewables in Scotland, and a variety of funds to promote 
community energy and carbon reduction initiatives (Scottish Government, 2011b). Thus, the 
Scottish government has faced both constitutional and fiscal constraints on its capacity for action, 
but these have not deterred it from pursuing ambitious policy goals.   
 
Economic Motivations 
Pioneering behaviour in energy and climate change has been associated with high levels of 
economic development, and a capacity to invest financially in low carbon technological 
innovations. Scotland may be among the most economically developed nations of Europe (see 
European Commission, 2010), but this in itself is an inadequate explanation for its climate and 
energy ambitions. A more powerful explanation can be found in the strategic economic 
motivations underpinning such action. More specifically, pioneering behaviour at either the 
national or sub-state level is often associated with a desire to create a competitive advantage for 
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domestic industry and exploit emerging markets in advanced technologies related to energy. Such 
economic incentives are clearly relevant to the Scottish case. 
 
Scottish policy initiatives, such as the Saltire Prize and other investment programmes noted above, 
seek to promote technological innovation within Scotland, boost Scottish industry, and maximize 
the exploitation of the country’s natural resources with a view to making Scotland a leading 
exporter of renewable energy. As the Scottish Finance Secretary noted, ‘Being at the forefront of 
efforts to tackle climate change has the added benefit of bringing opportunities for Scottish 
businesses, developing and producing technology for use both here and abroad’ (Swinney, 2007). 
Moreover, the Scottish government has estimated that achieving the 2020 renewables targets could 
provide ‘up to 40,000 jobs and generate £30bn investment to the Scottish economy’ (Scottish 
government, 2011b: 9). Although the absolute totals may be challenged, the scale of economic 
opportunity is largely supported by independent and industry estimates (Skills Development 
Scotland, 2011; Offshore Valuation Study, 2010). 
 
It is notable, too, that when promoting renewable energy, the SNP government has frequently 
drawn parallels with the discovery of North Sea oil, the exploitation of which remains central to 
the SNP’s economic and territorial objectives, as discussed below. Speaking at the launch of the 
Saltire Prize in Washington DC, First Minister Alex Salmond (2008) noted: 
 
40 years ago, with the discovery of oil in the North Sea off Scotland's coast, Scotland won the 
natural lottery… And we are fortunate that Scotland's energy resources go far beyond 
hydrocarbons… Our powerful waters and our driving offshore winds are key to our future 
prosperity…  we have won the natural lottery once again. 
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Renewable energy, like oil, is seen as a rich resource to be exploited for economic gain, as much if 
not more than an opportunity to fulfil low carbon ambitions. Indeed, that a low carbon agenda is 
pursued alongside a continued desire to exploit fossil fuels reveals that environmental concerns are 
not the principal driver of Scotland’s renewable energy programme.  
 
A Distinctive Policy Network 
Existing studies have pointed to the influence of environmental activists and other civil society 
actors from the scientific and business community, in encouraging and fostering innovation 
climate and energy policy (Scruggs 2003; Lenschow, et al, 2005; Lieffering, et al., 2009). 
Although the Scottish Green Party’s presence in the Scottish Parliament helps ensure 
environmental issues remain on the parliamentary agenda, with only two MSPs since 2007, its 
influence is minimal. By contrast, there is evidence to suggest that Scottish pioneering behaviour 
in both climate change and energy is significantly supported by a distinctive and relatively 
cohesive policy network comprised of a broad range of government and industry representatives, 
in particular, as well as labour unions, NGOs and other less formal environmental groups, sharing 
information, expertise and other resources.  
 
For example, a wide range of NGOs joined forces with church and labour organizations to form a 
cohesive and effective coalition under the banner, Stop Climate Chaos Scotland. Through intense 
lobbying it put pressure on the political parties to raise their ambitions during the passage of the 
Climate Change (Scotland) Act (interview with SCC parliamentary officer, 28 Aug 2009). Key 
business players, especially those involved in the renewables industry, also pressed for ambitious 
targets, identifying an opportunity for business innovation and investment. Most notable was the 
Scottish Climate Change Business Delivery Group, led by Ian Marchant, then chief executive of 
SSE (Scottish and Southern Energy), one of the largest firms in Scotland and the UK. It used its 
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position in the network – especially its access to ministers and senior civil servants - to push for 
the 42 percent 2020 target in the final stages of the legislative process (interview with minister, 15 
September 2011; interviews with senior officials, SSE, 10 January 2012). Motivated by a mix of 
individual and collective commitment and commercial gain, the Business Delivery Group has 
evolved into the 2020 Climate Group, a broader based coalition of industry leaders, academics, 
trade union leaders, local authority chief executives and NGO leaders. The 2020 Climate Group 
operates with the support of – but at arms’ length from – the Scottish government to identify and 
facilitate the changes in the public and commercial sectors necessary to fulfill Scotland’s climate 
ambitions (ibid., see also http://www.2020climate group.org.uk/).  
 
Policy networks exist on all levels, but the Scottish network in this area is distinct. Particularly 
striking is the extent to which such networks are actively nurtured and led by the Scottish 
government. The Business Delivery Group was instigated by the Environment minister (then a 
Liberal Democrat). Under the SNP, the Scottish government has successfully brought together 
supportive business partners but also other stakeholders, to help shape energy policy. In 2010, the 
government set up the Energy Advisory Board, chaired by the First Minister, to bring together 
officials from central and local government, business leaders, the scientific community, consumer 
organisations and trade unions. It has been supported by several sectoral groups, including the 
Forum for Renewable Energy Development in Scotland (FREDS), chaired by the Energy Minister 
and with similar cooperation from the energy industry, academia and other stakeholders (interview 
with energy official, 17 August 2011; interview former minister, 29 August 2011). The intensity 
of government-network engagement may reflect the lack of policy capacity within the government 
bureaucracy, and thus a dependence on outside expertise. However, it also suggests the extent to 
which government, the business and scientific community are united in their shared ambition and 
endeavour towards a low carbon future. Such informal bargaining and consensus building reflect a 
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form of networking often found among environmental pioneers states. What makes this case 
distinctive is the territorial scale at which this network operates, and the clear steer given to it by 
the Scottish government. 
 
Multi-level Drivers 
The existing literature suggests that environmental pioneers are engaged in a ‘two-level game’, 
focused not just on innovation at home, but also on pushing for change at a higher level. Within 
the EU, pioneers have sought to upload their preferences to supranational and international fora, 
both to minimize their own adjustment costs and maximize their competitive advantage. In the US, 
the federal government’s climate inaction led to a blossoming of innovation among US states.  
While our case study revealed the importance of multi-level drivers, their effect was distinctive. In 
contrast to the United States, Scottish climate action has not emerged in the face of inaction by 
either the UK government or the EU. At least with respect to policy discourse, outputs and 
international engagement, the UK government has itself been at the forefront of climate 
mitigation, even if domestic policy outcomes have some way to go to achieve ambitions (Carter, 
2008; Lovell, et al. 2009; Committee on Climate Change, 2012). The UK Climate Change Act in 
2008 also has ambitious mandatory emissions reduction targets, alongside relatively ambitious 
renewable energy targets. The EU, meanwhile, has actively developed mandatory targets in 
emissions reductions, energy efficiency and renewable energy among its member-states, and has 
pushed for stricter regulations in international climate change negotiations. In short, Scottish 
action cannot be explained by the ‘compensatory’ dynamic which has been used to account for 
climate innovation among many US states and Canadian provinces.  
 
Nonetheless, Scottish policy making is very much shaped and constrained by the multi-level 
context, which sees the Scottish government engaged in a three-level game, seeking to influence 
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policy outputs of both the UK government and European Union. The constitutional constraints 
within which Scottish climate policy is made demand that the Scottish government lobby the UK 
government, the Crown Estate and Ofgem (the energy regulator) when attempting to shape the 
regulatory framework surrounding energy, and significant effort is invested in doing so (interview 
with UK and Scottish officials, 23 September 2011; 28 September 2011). For example, a key 
priority of the Scottish government has been to seek changes to the transmission charging regime 
(constitutionally the preserve of the UK government) so that renewable energy investment in 
remote highlands and islands regions is better supported. Given its status as a regional government 
in the European Union, the Scottish government must also cooperate with the UK government to 
try to influence EU climate and energy policy indirectly. Only member states have a formal voice 
within the European Council. Where concessions are sought - such as the derogation from state aid 
regulation to permit the Scottish Renewable Obligation Certificates to give added investment to 
marine renewables (interview with Scottish Government official, 24 June 2010) - agreement must 
first be secured by the UK government, who must then negotiate with the Commission on 
Scotland’s behalf.  
 
European regions also invest in direct engagement with EU institutions, and Scotland is no 
exception. The Scottish government has made climate change and energy top priorities in its 
European engagement strategy, rivaled in importance only by fishing (Scottish Government, 
2009b). It established the Scottish European Green Energy Centre (SEGEC) to support academics, 
government and the energy industry in their efforts to access EU funds for green energy projects, 
with some notable successes. It has nurtured relations between senior ministers, European 
Commissioners and senior officials, and increasingly European Parliamentarians to advance 
Scottish interests in climate change and renewable energy (interview with special adviser, 8 
August 2011; interview with former minister, 29 August 2011). Much activity in Brussels is 
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focused on raising Scotland’s profile within EU institutions and among other member-state 
representatives as a leader in climate and energy policy, advancing Scottish interests, for example, 
in marine renewables and carbon capture and storage, and maximizing the extent to which it is 
seen as a ‘serious player’ in low carbon energy policy (interview with Scottish government 
official, 31 March 2012). According to senior officials working within DG Energy, the ambitions 
of the Scottish government in renewable energy and climate change have been heard ‘loud and 
clear’. The Commission, in turn, is keen to support Scotland’s clear comparative advantage in 
onshore wind and marine renewables, and use it as a positive example of low carbon innovation 
(interviews with Commission officials, 30 March 2011). 
 
The supranational dimension of climate change policy thus presents opportunities for, but also 
constraints upon, the Scottish government’s capacity to achieve its climate goals. Most 
constraining, perhaps, are the parameters set by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Around 40 
percent of Scotland’s emissions come from those industries that fall within the ‘traded sector’, and 
their emissions allowances are thus set by the EU scheme. Without an increase in the overall EU 
emissions reduction target from 20 percent to 30 percent, achieving the more ambitious Scottish 
emissions reduction targets will be extremely difficult, if not impossible (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2013). Consequently, the Scottish government has used every opportunity to push for a 
higher EU target, often in collaboration with the UK government (interview with official, 31 
March 2011; interview with Scottish government minister, 15 September 2011). 
  
The Politics of Territorial Identity 
Governments in sub-state nations and regions with a strong sense of territorial distinctiveness 
often seek to accentuate that distinctiveness, and to maximize and enhance their political 
autonomy. Scotland’s devolved institutions are new but they provide political representation for an 
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historic and distinctive nation within the United Kingdom. Even before the election of the SNP 
government in 2007, a desire to be more ambitious than the UK government was evident in 
devolved Scotland’s climate change programme. Later, the SNP government’s separate Scottish 
climate change legislation – arguably unnecessary as Scotland is already bound by the UK Climate 
Change Act and the UK’s EU obligations - was justified to reflect Scotland’s distinctive needs and 
potential, as well as being ‘a further demonstration of the leadership we want to provide to the rest 
of the world’ (Scottish Government, 2008: 11). The ambitious legislation also played to a desire to 
be seen as more progressive than their UK counterparts, and a ‘step ahead’ of the UK government 
in policy innovation (interview with special adviser, 14 June 2009). This desire not only pervades 
the Scottish National Party; it is to some extent evident too within the Scottish Labour Party, the 
SNP’s main political rival. Indeed, a game of political one-upmanship between the SNP and 
Labour during the passage of the climate change legislation – exploited effectively by 
environmental activists – helped encourage a ‘race to the top’ in the setting of targets, which 
ultimately resulted in unanimous agreement of one the world’s most ambitious greenhouse 
reduction targets.7  
 
All political parties in Scotland seeking electoral success must accentuate their Scottish credentials 
and their ability to bat for Scotland within the United Kingdom, but territorial self-government is 
at the SNP’s core. The SNP sees Scotland not as a region of the UK or even of Europe, but as a 
nation with an entitlement to statehood. Scottish independence is the party’s primary ambition, 
and its election as a majority government has led directly to the referendum on independence, 
scheduled for September 2014. The desire to maximize energy self-government is seen as an end 
in itself, to enhance the capacity to shape ‘the totality of policy’, engage directly with the EU as a 
member-state, and gain credence among the key players in the industry and internationally 
(interview with former minister, 29 August 2011). But issues of energy and climate change are 
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also implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, bound up with broader self-government goals. 
Addressing the Scottish Low Carbon Investment conference in 2010, First Minister Alex Salmond 
linked his government’s renewable energy programme to a desire for greater constitutional 
capacity, in this case, over the Crown Estate (discussed above):  
 
as we look on the cusp of this energy revolution, there are huge bonuses in terms of jobs and 
technology and the economy. But the only organization that currently directly benefits from 
the use of resources on land, the sea, the waves and the winds is The Crown Estate… it seems 
to me self-evident that the revenues from The Crown Estate should flow to the Scottish 
Government, to the Scottish Parliament, to the Scottish people as an endowment, as opposed to 
the Treasury (Salmond, 2010a). 
     
In October 2011, the First Minister opened his speech to his party’s conference on the issue of 
climate change – ‘the greatest issue facing this planet’ – and used it as evidence of Scotland’s self-
governing potential: ‘So, given that by international acclaim we have handled this mighty issue so 
well as a parliament, what possible argument could there be that the Scottish Parliament is not 
capable of discharging ALL of the issues facing the Scottish people?’ (Salmond, 2011).  
 
Successful nationalist mobilization is often supported by the promise of economic prosperity 
(Keating, 2001). The promotion of renewable energy as a route to re-industrialising Scotland is at 
least in part intended to fuel the demand for Scottish self-government, and to ease concerns about 
its economic consequences. In this regard, the frequent parallels drawn with the discovery of 
North Sea oil are notable. Just as oil was and remains a potent symbol of the SNP’s economically-
driven nationalism, so too does renewable energy and the transition to a low carbon economy hold 
the promise of an independent Scotland with energy security and energy wealth.  
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The existing literature on pioneering behavior among European nation-states and US states can 
thus go some way to explaining why a European regional government like the Scottish 
government would set pioneering climate goals, but it cannot offer a full explanation for the extent 
and character of climate ambition among Europe’s leading sub-state nations. The Scottish case 
illustrates the enduring importance of institutional, fiscal and policy capacity, but also the ways in 
which actors can overcome constraints by the deft use of policy networks, skilful navigation of the 
multi-level policy environment, and by emphasizing its non-constitutional and natural energy 
resources. Furthermore, the case confirms that pioneering action may be driven as much, if not 
more, by economic advantage and the exploitation of economic opportunities as by environmental 
principles. Economic motivations are certainly more evident than ‘green’ ambitions in the Scottish 
case. Our case study also points towards the importance of broader territorial and political interests 
underpinning climate action at the sub-state level.  In contrast to US states, these interests did not 
emerge in Scotland as a result of the inaction of the UK government or the EU; indeed they appear 
to be unrelated to the level of ambition evident at a higher level. The politics of renewable energy 
and climate change has offered the Scottish government the opportunity to assert its territorial 
distinctiveness on the national and international stage, and to use its policy levers to assert and 
reinforce the demand for self-government. 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The policy ambitions highlighted in the Scottish case are part of a broader phenomenon: climate 
governance requires action on, and invites innovation across, multiple governmental scales 
(Ostrom, 2010). Many sub-state governments have become increasingly bold, introducing policy 
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initiatives neglected or absent at higher levels. Not all sub-state governments are pioneers, of 
course; some may be laggards, slowing the pace of climate change mitigation at the national level. 
For instance, the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan have at times played this role 
(Harrison, 2007). All sub-state governments are affected, to some degree, by climate change, but 
many may be content to leave national and supranational institutions to set the policy agenda. In 
this concluding section, we use the findings of our case study to develop some hypotheses to 
explain why some sub-state governments have positioned themselves at the forefront of pioneering 
policy initiatives intended to mitigate climate change. 
 
First, our case study, coupled with the broader literature, suggests that sub-state governments will 
be more likely to pursue ambitious policy goals when they have the constitutional capacity to 
develop distinctive policies, the fiscal capacity to invest, and the natural, renewable resource 
capacity to exploit. The latter may also be linked to economic motivations if resource capacity also 
brings advantages for manufacturing industries or home-based energy suppliers. Those sub-state 
nations and regions most active on the national and international stage – including Scotland, the 
Basque country, Catalonia, Flanders, Wallonia, North Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, 
Quebec, British Columbia – are among the most powerful constitutionally, with high degrees of 
‘self-rule’ (see Bruyninckx, et al., 2012). Resource capacities and economic motivations are also 
evident in the capacity to exploit non-fossil fuels, for example the substantial existing hydro 
capacity in Scotland and Quebec, or to maximize the capacity for technological innovation and 
export, as in the case of the aforementioned German Länder. It might be expected that the 
presence or absence of oil reserves may also matter; the importance of the oil and gas industry in 
Alberta and Saskatchewan may be a factor in their reluctance to sign up to emissions reduction 
targets. What is intriguing about the Scottish case, however, is that it includes an embrace of both 
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‘old’ and ‘new’ energy: renewable energy and emissions reductions are pursued alongside the 
evident desire to reap the rewards (following independence) of North Sea oil.  
 
Our case study, and a glance at the most prominent players in the networks of regional 
governments discussed above, also suggests that strong identity nations and regions may be more 
likely than weak identity regions to pursue ambitious climate action. Although many strong 
identity regions are also strong constitutionally – potentially making it difficult to disentangle 
these variables – we can point to examples of pioneering climate action amongst strong identity 
regions with relatively weak constitutional capacity. Brittany and Wales, for example, have low 
‘self-rule’ but nonetheless ambitious agendas. In Brittany, this has been evident in an ambitions 
for offshore renewables, energy efficiency programmes and investment in small scale renewable 
development through a unique public-private partnership fund (the Eilañ). In Wales, the devolved 
administration has carved out a distinctive profile in sustainable development, especially relating 
to international development, and has a statutory duty to promote sustainability (Royles, 2012).  
 
There are two reasons why strong identity nations and regions may be found among climate 
pioneers. First, territorial distinctiveness can be a resource to help generate solidarity and consent 
among key players within a broader policy network, as well as among the broader public, 
potentially helping to overcome more formal capacity constraints. Second, sub-state nations and 
regions in the EU are bound by the targets and directives set at EU level. They cannot legally 
refuse to implement these agreements; either they or their member state would pay a heavy 
financial price for failing to fulfill EU obligations. Thus, the most effective way that a sub-state 
government seeking to assert territorial distinctiveness can do so in this policy arena is through 
demonstrating ambition by exceeding national and international targets.  
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Broader political factors may also underpin sub-state climate ambitions. Just as the presence of 
electorally strong green parties and green lobbies may foster environmental ambition at the 
national level, so too may we expect green party strength to correlate with sub-state ambition, as 
has been the case at both governmental levels in Germany. Green parties, however, are not 
especially strong among sub-state governments, pioneering or otherwise. The Scottish case study 
points towards other party political factors, suggesting a link between the pursuit of ambitious 
climate policies and the strength of parties pursuing territorial self-government. Although the 
Labour-Liberal Democrat government in office prior to 2007 also demonstrated some ambition 
within this policy sphere, and some of the measures since 2007 have secured unanimous support 
across parliamentary parties, there is no doubt that the election of an autonomist, pro-
independence party to the Scottish government was associated with a step-change in the scale of 
ambition in the emissions reduction and renewable energy programmes. For parties seeking 
greater political autonomy or independent statehood, like the SNP in Scotland, climate ambition 
provides an opportunity to nurture perceptions of national prosperity and self-sufficiency, and to 
engage in ‘paradiplomacy’ to assert national autonomy and nurture their perception internationally 
as ‘nation-states in waiting’ (Lecours, 2002; Cornago, 2010).  
 
 Conversely, climate ambition can provide opportunities for those resisting self-government 
demands by enabling them to assert territorial distinctiveness on the national and international 
stage through non-constitutional means, but without the need for political independence. The 
climate leadership demonstrated by the former Quebec Liberal Premier, Jean Charest, both 
nationally and internationally, provides a useful example of a government keen to assert its 
national distinctiveness and autonomy while opposing the pro-sovereignty position of its main 
Parti Québécois rival. The socialist Basque government, in power until 2012, like its nationalist 
predecessor was also active in the international climate arena in recent years, and used the 
 32 
opportunities of office to assert Basque leadership by developing a more overtly ambitious and 
extensive sustainable development strategy (Galarraga, 2011; de la Peña Varona and Barcena 
Hinojal, 2012). In sub-state nations such as these, the desire to enhance distinctiveness and 
political autonomy is ever-present, and manifests itself in climate ambition, even if the goal of 
constitutional independence is in dispute. Thus, the presence of a strong autonomist party - in 
government or challenging government from the opposition benches - may be the key driver. Such 
a party can impose on the government, irrespective of the party in power, the need to be seen to 
defend and promote territorial interests, assert territorial distinctiveness and maximize decision-
making autonomy. Pioneering climate action is but one avenue to pursue these broader political 
aims.  
 
Testing the validity of these hypotheses obviously requires further comparative analysis, and is 
beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear, however, is that sub-state governments have 
emerged as significant players in this policy arena, and their action merits close academic scrutiny. 
The framework and case study offered above are intended to provide a first step in this endeavour.   
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NOTES 
 
1 The Scottish Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition government’s renewable energy and climate change 
programmes were broadly aligned with UK government programmes and firmly embedded within them, but the 
Scottish climate change programme identified both Scotland’s equitable contribution to UK emissions reduction 
targets (‘the Scottish share’) and a ‘Scottish target’ which would exceed the Scottish share by a million tonnes 
of carbon (Scottish Executive, 2006; HM Government, 2006). 
 
2 The baseline is 1990 for CO2, but 1995 for some other greenhouse gases. 
 
3 Net emissions in 2010 were 1.1 MtCO2e above the level of the statutory target (53.652 MtCO2e) 
 
4 The Scottish overall energy target includes 500MW of community-owned renewable electricity and 11% of 
renewable heat (the latter from a 2011 baseline of less than 3%). The UK target is also relatively ambitious, 
given its low starting point; only 3.3% of UK energy consumption came from renewable sources in 2010 
(DECC, 2011a: 13).  
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5 In nine cases, background noise rendered recording futile, while in several other cases where discussions were 
politically sensitive, we took the view that greater insight may be gleaned from interviews which were not 
recorded. 
 
6 The Renewables Obligation requires licensed electricity suppliers to source a specific and annually increasing 
percentage of the electricity they supply from renewable sources.  The UK white paper on Electricity Market 
Reform indicated that the RO would be phased out replaced by a Feed-in-Tariff with a Contract for Difference 
(see DECC, 2011b). 
 
7 The SNP government initially favoured a target of 34%, equivalent to the UK target albeit covering a broader 
range of emissions. However, when Labour pushed for a higher target of 40% emissions reductions by 2020, the 
SNP government outbid them with a 42% target. Since neither party wanted to be seen as less progressive than 
the other, they both led the whole parliament towards unanimous consent for the 42% target.  
